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ralph lauren polo

 
Dinko Dimitrov
 
''Top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability''
( 2006, Vol. 4 No.12 )
 
 
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) are sufficient conditions for core stability in hedonic games. We introduce the semistrict core as a stronger stability concept than the core, and show that the top coalition property guarantees the existence of semistrictly core stable coalition structures. Moreover, for each game satisfying the common ranking property, the core and the semistrict core coincide.
 
 
Keywords: coalition formation
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 19 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 20 2006

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