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Kenji Fujiwara
 
''A Stackelberg Game Model of Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices''
( 2006, Vol. 12 No.12 )
 
 
We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each point of time. Then, we compare the resulting outcomes with those in a Stackelberg model without price stickiness.
 
 
Keywords: dynamic duopoly
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 22 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 22 2006

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