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Akira Ogawa and Kazuhiko Kato
''Price Competition in a Mixed Duopoly''
( 2006, Vol. 12 No.4 )
We analyze sequential and simultaneous price setting under a mixed duopoly with homogeneous products and symmetric quadratic cost functions. When public firm is the follower, there exists the case that the equilibrium price is highest of all timings.
JEL: L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : Jun 19 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 18 2006

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