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Kenji Fujiwara and Norimichi Matsueda
''On a Nonlinear Feedback Strategy Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.8 )
This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium in such a framework, the nonlinear feedback strategy can be properly defined and, furthermore, a particular type of the equilibrium outcomes approximates the bilateral collusion, as is originally proved by Tsutsui and Mino (1990) for a standard differential game with one state variable.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
Manuscript Received : Feb 20 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 24 2007

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