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Ismail Saglam and Semih Koray
 
''Learning in Bayesian regulation: desirable or undesirable?''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.12 )
 
 
We examine the social desirability of learning about the regulated agent in a generalized principal-agent model with incomplete information. An interesting result we obtain is that there are situations in which the agent prefers a Bayesian regulator to have more, yet incomplete, information about his private type.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 06 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 08 2007

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