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ralph lauren polo

Krzysztof Apt
''{Relative Strength of Strategy Elimination Procedures''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.21 )
We compare here the relative strength of four widely used procedures on finite strategic games: iterated elimination of weakly/strictly dominated strategies by a pure/mixed strategy. A complication is that none of these procedures is based on a monotonic operator. To deal with this problem we use 'global' versions of these operators
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
Manuscript Received : Jun 06 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 07 2007

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