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Ismail Saglam and Ayse Mumcu
 
''The core of a housing market with externalities''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.57 )
 
 
It is known that the core of a housing market always exists and contains a unique matching when agents have independent preferences. We show that when preferences of agents are interdependent, there are housing markets with an empty core as well as housing markets with a core containing more than one matching.
 
 
Keywords: core.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 07 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 07 2007

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