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ralph lauren polo

 
Anne van den Nouweland
 
''Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.43 )
 
 
I provide an elegant proof identifying the unique mixed Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. The proof is based on intuition rather than elimination of cases. It shows that for any mixed strategy other than the one that puts equal probability on each of a player's actions, it holds that this strategy is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 12 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 18 2007

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