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Wojciech Olszewski
 
''A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.58 )
 
 
Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using recursive techniques. The purpose of this paper is to explain the general method of constructing belief-free equilibria, and the limit (or bound) on the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved in these strategies in a way that should be easily accessible, even for those who do not pretend to be experts in repeated games.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 08 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 12 2007

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