All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez, Ruben Juarez and Luis Hernandez-Lamoneda
''Solutions without dummy axiom for TU cooperative games''
( 2008, Vol. 3 No.1 )
In this paper we study an expression for all additive, symmetric and efficient solutions, i.e., the set of axioms that traditionally are used to characterize the Shapley value except for the dummy axiom. Also, we obtain an expression for this kind of solutions by including the self duality axiom. These expressions allow us to give an alternative formula for the consensus value, the generalized consensus value and the solidarity solution. Furthermore, we introduce a new axiom called coalitional independence which replaces the symmetry axiom and use it to get similar results.
Keywords: axiomatic characterization
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
Manuscript Received : Jan 10 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 11 2008

  This abstract has been downloaded 399 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87740 times