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ralph lauren polo

 
Arthur Robson and Tiemen Woutersen
 
''Efficiency and converse reduction-consistency in collective choice''
( 2007, Vol. 4 No.28 )
 
 
We consider the problem of selecting a subset of a feasible set over which each agent has a strict preference. We propose an invariance property, converse reduction-consistency, which is the converse of reduction-consistency introduced by Yeh (2006), and study its implications. Our results are two characterizations of the Pareto rule: (1) it is the only rule satisfying efficiency and converse reduction-consistency and (2) it is the only rule satisfying one-agent efficiency, converse reduction-consistency, and reduction-consistency.
 
 
Keywords: consistency converse consistency efficiency Pareto rule social choice correspondences.
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 31 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 10 2007

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