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| Juan Carlos Chavez-Martin del Campo |
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| ''Efficiency in the cake-eating problem with quasi-geometric discounting'' |
| ( 2007, Vol. 4 No.43 ) |
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| This paper shows that any equilibrium allocation in the cake-eating problem with quasi-geometric discounting is not Pareto efficient. However, efficiency can be established by introducing a planner who controls the initial endowment and makes transfers over time. It is shown than any Pareto efficient allocation can be supported by a perfect equilibrium with transfers. |
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| Keywords: Pareto efficiency |
JEL: D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth: General
D6 - Welfare Economics: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Nov 05 2007 | | Manuscript Accepted : Nov 14 2007 |
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