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ralph lauren polo

 
Juan Carlos Chavez-Martin del Campo
 
''Efficiency in the cake-eating problem with quasi-geometric discounting''
( 2007, Vol. 4 No.43 )
 
 
This paper shows that any equilibrium allocation in the cake-eating problem with quasi-geometric discounting is not Pareto efficient. However, efficiency can be established by introducing a planner who controls the initial endowment and makes transfers over time. It is shown than any Pareto efficient allocation can be supported by a perfect equilibrium with transfers.
 
 
Keywords: Pareto efficiency
JEL: D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth: General
D6 - Welfare Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 05 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 14 2007

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