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Gerhard Kling
''Disclosure of mergers without regulatory restrictions: Insider trading in pre-1914 Germany''
( 2008, Vol. 7 No.2 )
In the pre-World-War I period, lacking regulatory restrictions allowed ‘hidden' mergers however, some companies disclosed information voluntarily. I analyze insider gains by investigating the share price behavior prior to merger announcements. When companies hid information, stocks exhibited positive abnormal returns prior to newspaper reports that uncovered hidden transactions.
N2 - Economic History: Financial Markets and Institutions: General, International, or Comparative
Manuscript Received : Oct 15 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 05 2008

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