All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Pedro Cosme Vieira and Samuel Pereira
 
''How to control market power of activity centers? A theoretical model showing the advantages of implementing competition within organizations''
( 2007, Vol. 7 No.6 )
 
 
One important issue in firms' governance is how to incentives so that activity centres can become more efficient. In this paper, we first introduce an agency contract where the salary of the manager of an activity centre that produces an intermediate product is dependent of its performance. Secondly, we add competition within the organization. This latter point is new in the literature. We then develop a "static analysis" comparing a firm that has only one activity centre producing an intermediate product with another firm that has two activity centres producing the same intermediate product, in a context where the technology manifests increasing returns to scale. We conclude that the introduction of internal competition makes the firm globally more efficient, even though it cannot fully explore the existence of increasing returns to scale.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 19 2007 Manuscript Accepted : May 18 2007

  This abstract has been downloaded 1917 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87692 times