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Jakub Steiner
 
''A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms''
( 2007, Vol. 8 No.1 )
 
 
It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jan 19 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 19 2007

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