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Vasileios Zikos
 
''Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with asymmetric subsidies''
( 2007, Vol. 12 No.13 )
 
 
In a mixed oligopoly, when the public leader becomes a private leader and the government provides output subsidies, then privatization causes the optimal subsidy, profits and welfare to fall [Economics Letters 83 (2004) 411]. We show instead that if the leader and the followers receive asymmetric, rather than symmetric subsidies, the first-best optimum can be restored. In this case, privatization bears no consequences on the followers' subsidy, output and welfare.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: L0 - Industrial Organization: General
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 08 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 21 2007

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