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Ramon Fauli-Oller and Lluis Bru
 
''Horizontal mergers for buyer power''
( 2008, Vol. 12 No.3 )
 
 
Salant et al. (1983) showed in a Cournot setting that horizontal mergers are unprofitable because outsiders react by increasing their output. We show that this negative effect may be compensated by the positive effect that horizontal mergers have on the buyer power of merging firms in input markets.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL:
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 25 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 18 2008

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