All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

Kangsik Choi
''Mixed Motives of Simultaneous-move Games in a Mixed Duopoly: Comments and Erratum''
( 2007, Vol. 12 No.32 )
If the public and private firm have mixed motives about payoff in a simultaneous-move game, Choi (2006) analyzes that the resulting equilibrium turns out to be an inefficient level with the monopoly of private firm even if there are Nash equilibria. However, we find that if we use equilibrium profit, we would have solved its unique Nash equilibrium that both firms aim to maximize the relative payoffs.
Keywords: Mixed Duopoly
JEL: L0 - Industrial Organization: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 22 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 30 2007

  This abstract has been downloaded 418 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87750 times