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Yasuhiko Nakamura and Tomohiro Inoue
''Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case''
( 2007, Vol. 12 No.27 )
We introduce managerial delegation into Pal's (1998) model and examine the impact of the introduction of managerial delegation on endogenous timing in a mixed duopolistic model for differentiated goods. We show that a public firm and a private firm choose quantities sequentially in the equilibrium of our model. Thus, we find that the Pal''s (1998) results are robust against managerial delegation.
Keywords: Endogenous Timing
JEL: L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Manuscript Received : Oct 10 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 19 2007

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