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Yasuo Sanjo
 
''Hotelling's Location Model with Quality Choice in Mixed Duopoly''
( 2007, Vol. 18 No.2 )
 
 
We investigate a mixed duopoly market by introducing quality choice into the Hotelling-type spatial competition model with linear transportation costs. We show that there does not exist a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of location choice in the three-stage game that is location-then-quality choice and subsequent price choice. Moreover, we show the conditions of the existence of the quality equilibrium.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: R3 - Production Analysis and Firm Location: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 22 2007 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 27 2007

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