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Matthew Jackson and Alison Watts
 
''Equilibrium Existence in Bipartite Social Games: A Generalization of Stable Matchings''
( 2008, Vol. 3 No.12 )
 
 
We prove existence of equilibria in bipartite social games, where players choose both a strategy in a game and a partner with whom to play the game. Such social games generalize the well-known marriage problem where players choose partners but do not take actions subsequent to matching.
 
 
Keywords: Social Games
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
A1 - General Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 25 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 02 2008

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