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ralph lauren polo

 
Francesca Centrone and Claudia Meo
 
''Value allocations in economies with coalition structure''
( 2008, Vol. 3 No.49 )
 
 
We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition structures (b) the process of coalition formation is treated as endogenous. To this end we introduce the definition of stable coalition structure value allocation and provide, under standard hypotheses, a preliminary existence result for the three player case in an exchange economy.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 23 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 25 2008

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