All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

Anders Poulsen and Odile Poulsen
''A note on commitment when there are errors in communication''
( 2008, Vol. 3 No.74 )
In this note we analyze the viability of a commitment strategy when there are errors in communication. We consider an entry deterrence game where with a certain probability the Incumbent's decision is either perfectly observed by the Potential Intruder or, with complementary probability, nothing is observed. We find that in equilibrium the Incumbent benefits as much from a decision to accommodate entry as a commitment to fight entry being observed with sufficiently high probability by the potential intruder. Indeed, there is an equilibrium where the Incumbent commits to fight entry with probability one even when this action is observed with zero probability.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
Manuscript Received : Sep 28 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 07 2008

  This abstract has been downloaded 493 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 92684 times