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Alex Possajennikov
 
''Commitment in symmetric contests''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 )
 
 
The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contests with concave success function, commitment to a particular strategy does not increase a player's payoff, while in contests with more than two players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game in which commitment does not increase a player''s payoff for any number of players.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 08 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 23 2009

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