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Dolors Berga, Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó and Gustavo Bergantiños
 
''On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit''
( 2008, Vol. 4 No.21 )
 
 
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership. Thus, they must take into account, when voting, the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative but also on the final composition of the society. We show that, under plausible restrictions on preferences, equilibria of this two-stage game satisfy stability and voter's sovereignty.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 15 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 03 2008

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