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| Kojun Hamada |
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| ''Second-mover advantage under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model'' |
| ( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 ) |
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| This paper examines which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model. We show that even if governments choose export subsidies in whichever of a simultaneous-move or sequential-move game, the leader firm always loses its first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly. Furthermore, we examine the endogenous timing of subsidies by governments and show that the second-mover advantage occurs with regard to profit and welfare under the endogenous timing of subsidies. |
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| Keywords: Stackelberg competition |
JEL: F1 - Trade: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Sep 29 2008 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 23 2009 |
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