All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Kojun Hamada
 
''Second-mover advantage under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 )
 
 
This paper examines which of the Stackelberg leader or its follower has the advantage under strategic subsidy policy in a third market model. We show that even if governments choose export subsidies in whichever of a simultaneous-move or sequential-move game, the leader firm always loses its first-mover advantage in a Stackelberg duopoly. Furthermore, we examine the endogenous timing of subsidies by governments and show that the second-mover advantage occurs with regard to profit and welfare under the endogenous timing of subsidies.
 
 
Keywords: Stackelberg competition
JEL: F1 - Trade: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 29 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 23 2009

  This abstract has been downloaded 325 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87724 times