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ROSELLA LEVAGGI and FRANCESCO MENONCIN
 
''Merit goods provision and optimal tax evasion''
( 2008, Vol. 8 No.7 )
 
 
In a recent article Davidson, Lawrence and Wilson propose a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxation and goods of different quality, tax evasion can be an optimal device. Here, we show that this result, although quite interesting, cannot be generalised to a framework where Government activity consists of supplying merit goods and levying taxes to finance their provision.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 18 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 26 2008

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