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Qiang Wang and Qi Chen
 
''Cournot competition and location choice with wage bargaining''
( 2008, Vol. 12 No.22 )
 
 
Equilibrium locations are analyzed in location-quantity games, in which firms acquire labor inputs through bilateral monopoly relations with independent labor union. We find that the pattern of locations varies as the transport rate increase in a linear city. In a circular city, firms locate equidistant form each other.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 31 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 07 2008

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