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Rudra Sensarma and Bibhas Saha
 
''The Distributive Role of Managerial Incentives in a Mixed Duopoly''
( 2008, Vol. 12 No.28 )
 
 
We study a mixed oligopoly where a partially public firm competeswith a private firm. When the private firm offers managerialincentives, there is a redistribution of profit and output fromthe private to the public firm, but the aggregate output andsocial welfare may remain unchanged. When the private firm isforeign owned, the extent of privatization is less whilemanagerial incentives are milder.
 
 
Keywords: mixed duopoly
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 31 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 31 2008

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