All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Nicolas Gruyer
''A note on quantity precommitment, cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 )
This paper extends Kreps and Scheinkman's 1983 result, which shows that a production capacity choice stage followed by price competition yields the same outcome as a Cournot game, to a setting where capacity costs are asymmetric.
Keywords: Asymmetric costs
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 22 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 23 2009

  This abstract has been downloaded 1752 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 156011 times