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Jorge Fernández-Ruiz
''Managerial Delegation in a Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.1 )
We examine firms' decisions to hire managers in a duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. In contrast with the case in which the public firm competes with a domestic private firm -where only the private firm decides to hire a manager- we find that both firms hire managers. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when neither firm hires a manager.
Keywords: Mixed oligopoly
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
Manuscript Received : Dec 02 2008 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 13 2009

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