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Qiang Wang, Yuanyuan He and Qi Chen
 
''Spatial Cournot competition and timing of endogenous wage setting''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.3 )
 
 
This paper studies the problem of location-quantity choice in a duopoly in which the wage paid by each firm is set by the corresponding monopoly union. Compared with the outcome obtained in location-price choice game, we find that the wage setting choice for both unions does not change in our model, they still choose to set wage sequentially. The equilibrium locations are not influenced by the timing of wage setting.
 
 
Keywords: endogenous product costs spatial competition Cournot model location choice
JEL: J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 19 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 26 2009

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