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ralph lauren polo

 
Tommy Andersson
 
''A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.3 )
 
 
This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.
 
 
Keywords: assignment game, fairness, strategy-proofness
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Social Choice
 
Manuscript Received : May 08 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 20 2009

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