All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Boniface Mbih, Issofa Moyouwou and Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye
 
''Parliamentary voting rules and strategic candidacy''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.2 )
 
 
In this paper we study the vulnerability of parliamentary voting procedures to strategic candidacy. Candidates involved in an election are susceptible to influence the outcome by opting out or opting in. In the context of three-alternative elections and under the impartial anonymous culture assumption, we evaluate the frequencies of such strategic candidacy opportunities.
 
 
Keywords: strategic candidacy, parliamentary voting procedures, opting out, opting in, impartial anonymous culture.
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D7 - Social Choice
 
Manuscript Received : May 23 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 08 2009

  This abstract has been downloaded 338 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87717 times