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Christopher R Mcintosh, Jason F Shogren and Andrew J Moravec
 
''Can tournaments induce rational play in the centipede game? Exploring dominance vs. strategic uncertainty ''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.3 )
 
 
We compare behavior in a one-shot Centipede game across several payoff structures including nonlinear payoff tournaments. Assuming Nash to be optimal, results suggest nonlinear tournament payoffs based on overall relative rewards are not sufficient to increase Nash results in the one-shot Centipede style setting. Evidence suggests that reducing strategic uncertainty is more important than increasing dominance in promoting Nash play.
 
 
Keywords: Centipede game, payoff tournaments, experiment, strategic uncertainty, dominance
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C9 - Design of Experiments: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 27 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Aug 18 2009

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