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ralph lauren polo

 
Tin-chun Lin
 
''Application of a static game of complete information: economic behaviors of professors and students''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.3 )
 
 
The economic behaviors manifested between professors and students may be viewed as a game, with both behaviors endogenously correlated. In this paper, a static game is applied to address this behavior and determine the Nash equilibrium. Both professors and students choose their best strategies (i.e., optimal efforts) to maximize their payoffs. Consequently, theoretical analysis suggests that professor's evaluation and student's grade are endogenously correlated. More importantly, an innovation is offered here that is useful in constructing empirical models for the further investigation of this issue.
 
 
Keywords: Economic behavior; Static game; Student evaluations of teaching
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D0 - Microeconomics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 02 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 16 2009

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