All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Toshiki Kodera
 
''Spatial competition among multiple platforms''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.2 )
 
 
We study spatial competition in two-sided markets, in which platforms engage in price competition in a circular city. After analyzing the pricing and profits of the unique symmetric equilibrium for a given number of platforms, we derive the number of platforms under free entry and compare it with the social optimum. We consider the case with or without a price restriction. In contrast to the excess entry result in Salop's (1979) model, the number of platforms is smaller than the social optimum if a minimum price binds, and if cross-group network effects are sufficiently large for a group of agents.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 01 2009 Manuscript Accepted : May 25 2010

  This abstract has been downloaded 312 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87735 times