All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Sougata Poddar and Bibhas Saha
''Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.2 )
We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a two-stage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.
Keywords: R&D Effort, Product differentiation, Collusion
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L1 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Manuscript Received : Sep 01 2009 Manuscript Accepted : May 16 2010

  This abstract has been downloaded 1674 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 156037 times