All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Yann Braouezec
''Incomplete third-degree price discrimination, and market partition problem''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.4 )
We introduce in this paper the "incomplete" third-degree price discrimination, which is the situation where a monopolist must charge at most k different prices while the total market is composed of n markets, with n>k. We thus study the optimal partition problem of the n markets in k groups. As a byproduct, when k=2, we are able to reconsider the so-called (Robinsonian) weak-strong partition.
Keywords: Price discrimination, monopoly, decentralized decision process, optimal partition problem, profit maximization
L1 - Monopoly
Manuscript Received : Sep 25 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 20 2009

  This abstract has been downloaded 1588 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 154645 times