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Hans Gersbach
''On higher hurdles for incumbents''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 )
The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents.
Keywords: Third JEL Category: H4 Keywords: Elections, political contracts, vote-share thresholds, incumbents, selection, effort.
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Manuscript Received : Oct 08 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 24 2010

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