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Douadia Bougherara, Sandrine Costa, Gilles Grolleau and Lisette Ibanez
 
''Dealing with aversion to the sucker's payoff in public goods games''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.4 )
 
 
A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker's payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an insurance against getting the sucker's payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective' design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.
 
 
Keywords: Experiments, Public good, Sucker's payoff, Assurance
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
 
Manuscript Received : Nov 30 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 23 2009

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