All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Samir Amine, Pedro Lages dos santos, Sylvain Baumann and Fabrice Valognes
 
''Revisiting Nash wages negotiations in matching models''
( 2009, Vol. 29 No.4 )
 
 
In labour economics theory, wage negotiations use to rely on a Symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution. The aim of this study is to show that this kind of solution may be not relevant. Indeed, in a matching model framework, the comparison with the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution suggests that a reflection should systematically be made with respect to the negotiation power of each agent (a same ascertainment has been pointed out by McDonald and Solow (1981)). Finally, we characterize the Kalai-Smorodinsky in the job matching setting.
 
 
Keywords: Matching, bargaining solutions, public policy.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 04 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 23 2009

  This abstract has been downloaded 273 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87713 times