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ralph lauren polo

 
Juan Carlos Barcena-Ruiz
 
''Strategic Delegation and Semipublic Firms''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.1 )
 
 
By considering a mixed oligopoly and considering that public firms are less efficient than private firms, White (2001) shows that if private firms hire managers then the public firm does not do so. We show in this paper that if we consider that a private firm competes with a firm that is owned jointly by both the private and public sectors (a semipublic firm) and that all the firms are equally efficient, then in equilibrium both firms hire managers.
 
 
Keywords: Mixed duopoly, Semipublic Firms, Managerial incentive contracts, Cournot competition
JEL: L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 09 2010 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 17 2010

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