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Juan Gabriel Brida, María J. Such-devesa, Marta Faias and Alberto Pinto
 
''Strategic Choice in Tourism with Differentiated Crowding Types''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.2 )
 
 
We introduce a model of tourism choice where we consider that the choice of a tourism resort by a tourist, depends not only on the characteristics of the product offered by the resort but depends also on certain characteristics -crowding types- of the other tourists that have chosen the same resort. To get insights about the effect of crowding types in the allocation of tourists across resorts we exploit a club formation approach and model the framework by means of a Nash game. We establish existence of strategic equilibrium and characterize relevant equilibria.
 
 
Keywords: Crowding types, Nash equilibrium, strategic choice of tourism resort
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
L8 - Industry Studies: Services: General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 17 2010 Manuscript Accepted : May 21 2010

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