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Meixing Dai
 
''Multiplicative uncertainty, central bank transparency and optimal degree of conservativeness''
( 2010, Vol. 30 No.3 )
 
 
This paper extends the results of Kobayashi (2003) and Ciccarone and Marchetti (2009) by considering the optimal choice of central bank conservativeness. It is shown that the government can choose a sufficiently populist but opaque central banker so that higher multiplicative uncertainty improves the social welfare only when the society is very conservative.
 
 
Keywords: Multiplicative uncertainty; optimal degree of conservativeness; Brainard conservatism; central bank transparency.
JEL: E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 26 2010 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 06 2010

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