All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Charles Figuières and Frédéric Rychen
 
''Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.1 )
 
 
In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.
 
 
Keywords: heterogeneity, over(under)-investment, strategic complementarity, strategic substitutability, two-player games
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D6 - Welfare Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 11 2010 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 26 2011

  This abstract has been downloaded 253 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87735 times