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| Charles Figuières and Frédéric Rychen |
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| ''Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games'' |
| ( 2011, Vol. 31 No.1 ) |
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| In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability. |
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| Keywords: heterogeneity, over(under)-investment, strategic complementarity, strategic substitutability, two-player games |
JEL:
D6 - Welfare Economics: General |
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| Manuscript Received : May 11 2010 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jan 26 2011 |
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