All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Luciano Fanti and Nicola Meccheri
''The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential in a differentiated duopoly with unions and labour decreasing returns''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.1 )
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a differentiated duopoly, total wage bill maximizing unions and labour decreasing returns. It is shown that the standard result, that equilibrium profits are always higher under Cournot, may be reversed even for a fairly low degree of product differentiation. Moreover, the presence of diminishing returns to labour tends to reinforce the mechanisms that contribute to the reversal result, making this event possible for a wider range of situations, with respect to those identified by the earlier literature.
Keywords: Cournot-Bertrand profit differential, unions, labour decreasing returns
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 08 2010 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 09 2011

  This abstract has been downloaded 1681 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 153793 times