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Katerina Sherstyuk
 
''Complexity and bidder behavior in iterative auctions''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.4 )
 
 
We extend the finite automata approach to evaluate complexity of strategies in iterative adjustment processes such as auctions. Intuitively, a strategy's complexity is equal to the number of different contingencies in which qualitatively different behaviors are prescribed. Complexity may explain bidder choice of strategies in multi-unit iterative auctions.
 
 
Keywords: ascending auctions; complexity; finite automata; experimental evidence
JEL: C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jan 19 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 05 2011

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