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ralph lauren polo

 
Keiichi Morimoto
 
''Inflation inertia and optimal delegation of monetary policy''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.2 )
 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between the optimal weight on output gap in the central bank's loss function and the degree of inertia in a hybrid version of New Keynesian model with a pure discretionary inflation targeting. I show that under endogenous persistence of inflation dynamics, even in discretionary monetary policy regime, a Rogoff's (1985) conservative central banker does not necessarily improve social welfare.
 
 
Keywords: hybrid New Keynesian model; inflation targeting; policy weight
JEL: E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 02 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 15 2011

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