All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Claudine Desrieux and Jean Beuve
''Relational contracts as a foundation for contractual incompleteness''
( 2011, Vol. 31 No.3 )
Contractual incompleteness is generally defined by a trade-off between costs and benefits. We examine this trade-off in a dynamic setting and show how the ability of the parties to sustain a relational contract leads to more incomplete contracts.
Keywords: Contractual incompleteness, Relational Contract, Reputation, Repeated Games
JEL: L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
D2 - Production and Organizations: General
Manuscript Received : Mar 27 2011 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 08 2011

  This abstract has been downloaded 1524 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 153794 times